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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case centers aronnd a dispute over Appellants' easement rights. Appellants 
Charles and Matjorie Bratton ("Brattons") are seeking to expand the scope and use of an 
easement for ingress and egress and maintenance .of an irrigation ditch upon the servient 
estate owned during the relevant timeframe by Respondents John and Jackie Scott ("Scotts"). 
The Brattons' easement rights arise from a written warranty deed agreed upon by the Brattons 
and former owners'ofthe servient estate. Despite the clear tenus of the scope and nature of 
the easement set forth in the warranty deed, the Brattons filed the underlying lawsuit in an 
attempt to expand the size and scope of this easement. 
The Brattons further claimed that the Scotts were interfering with their easement 
rights. The Scotts, however, have only requested the Brattons exercise their easement rights 
within the scopeofthewritten easement and respect the Scotts' property rights as owners of 
the servient estate. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondents do not agree with many of the statements made in Appellants' 
description ofthe course of proceedings. (Appellants' Brief("App. BrieF'), pp. 2-4). The 
Scotts will therefore .provide the Court with a summary of the course of proceedings relevant . 
to this appear as follows: 
1. On June 28, 2007, the Brattons filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. , 
The Complaint included a claim for declaratory relief requesting a declaration as follows: 
Plaintiffs have a recorded and express easement as granted by 
Harold E. Ford and Jeanette B. Ford. Plaintiffs also have an 
easement by implication from prior use, for the remaining nine 
feet in width on the easement, as there was unity of title, 
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(R, pp. 5-6). 
subsequent separation, continuous and regular use, and such 
use was reasonably necessary to the proper eJtioyrnent of the 
easement by Plaintiffs. 
2. The Complaint also contained a claim for an injunction requesting that 
Defendants be precluded from "interfering with Plaintiffs' access and use of their easement 
on Lot 40 ofthe Fruitdale Farm SUbdivision." The Brattons further requested the district 
court grant injunctive relief that "[ w ]ould allow the placement of a covered pipe or culvert 
system across the easement area with all costs thereto paid by the Defendants." (R, pp. 6-7). 
3. In addition to the request for an injunction and declaratory relief, the 
Complaint contains the following causes of action: (1) negligence andlor willful wanton 
and/or intentional conduct; and (2) tortious interference with the right ofprivacy/tortious 
stalking. (R, pp. 6-8). In the prayer for relief, the Brattons requested declaratory relief in a 
judgment against the Scotts setting forth that "Plaintiffs have an express easement for three 
feet as set in its original location by Mr. Ford, that Plaintiffs have a 12 foot wide easement by 
implication in use, and that Plaintiffs possess legal rights to access and utilize their 12 foot 
easement on Lot 40, and take all reasonable steps for the maintenance thereof." (R, p. 8). 
4. The prayer for relief also requested injunctive relief precluding the Scotts 
from "[v ]erbally or physically threatening Plaintiffs or otherwise interfering with Plaintiffs' 
access and use of their 12 foot easement on Lot 40; that Defendants be denied access to the 
Plaintiffs' easement unless they obtain prior court approval; that Defendants be required to 
stay at a distance from Plaintiffs of at least 600 feet; ... [and] that Defendants be required to 
pay all costs for a covered pipe or culvert system to be placed the length of Plaintiffs' 
easement ditch." (R, p. 8). The Complaint contained a demand for jury trial contained on 
the last page. (R, p. 9). 
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5. In Appellants' Opening Brief, they claim their equitable relief claims as set 
forth in the Complaint were never heard "[ d]ue to the trial court's scheduling issues." (App. 
Brief, p. 2). This is an inaccurate statement. In fact, at no time during the pendency of this 
action did the Appellants ever make a motion for a preliminary injunction, permanent 
injunction, or any type of declaratory relief prior to the time of trial. In addition, at no time 
did the Appellants ever request dates from the district court for a hearing on such a motion 
that Scotts are aware of. 
6. The Brattons did make a motion for summary judgment, which was heard by 
the district court on February 21,2008. (Tr, Vo. I, pp. 29-32). In their motion, the Brattons 
requested a ruling that they be granted an express easement of three feet in width pursuant to 
the terms of the warranty deed. The Brattons further requested the court grant them as a 
matter oflaw an expanded easement of 12 feet in width under the theory ofimplied easement 
by prior use.· Third, the Brattons requested judgment in their favor on the issue of whether 
the Brattons' easement rights were infringed upon. (Tr, Vol. I, pp. 31-32). 
7. The Scotts, however, readily admitted the existence of the express easement 
as set forth in the warranty deed. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs on this issue noting that there was not an objection to the existence of the 
three foot expressed easement. 
8. The Scotts did object to the existence of an easement 12 feet in width under 
the doctrine of implied easement by prior use, and to the claim for interference with 
easement. The district court denied summary judgment on both ofthese claims, ruling that 
under the undisputed facts the Brattons could not sustain the elements of a 12 foot easement 
by implication of prior use. (Tr, Vol. I, pp. 56-69). In fact, the district court stated with 
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respect to the Brattons' claim for a 12 foot easement by implication from prior use as 
follows: 
I think it's critical to deciding this case to note that the ditch 
was built because of the sale to the Brattons. That ditch was 
not built prior to the sale to the Brattons. Mr. Ford did not 
build the ditch to irrigate the other parcel of property. And if 
the Brattons had wanted a twelve-foot easement, they could 
have requested it. 
I conclude, therefore, that there is not an issue of fact to be 
heard by a jury in this case, and I'm going to grant summary 
judgment in the contrary to the defendants. They are opposing 
it, but the way I see it, that issue is done. 
(Tr, Vol. I, p. 61, 11. 3-15). 
9. Prior to trial, the Scotts made a motion to bifurcate the proceedings between 
the issues ofliability and damages. (Tr, Vol. I, pp. 146-147). In response to this motion, the 
district court ruled that the trial would be heard in three separate phases. The first phase 
would involve the issue of whether there was a 12 foot easement by implication. During the 
second phase, the jury would hear the claims for negligent interference with easement and 
tortious interference with the Brattons' right of privacy. Finally, the third phase would be on 
damages, depending on the outcome of the second phase. (Tr, Vol. I, pp. 200-201). 
10. Following a motion for reconsideration filed by the Scotts, the district court 
ruled that the issue of whether a 12 foot wide easement by implication from prior use had 
arisen was an issue that the court would decide, instead of the jury, given that this claim was 
pled in the Brattons' Complaint as an equitable action for declaratory relief. (Tr, Vol. I, pp. 
250-252). The district court decided, however, to allow the jury to hear evidence on this 
issue and issue an advisory verdict. (Id.). 
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11. Pursuant to the district court's ruling, a jury trial was held commencing on 
September 3, 2008. At the end of phase one of the trial, the jury returned a special verdict 
form in favor of the Scotts answering as follows: 
(R, p. 437). 
Question No.1: Have the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof 
by establishing that they have a 12 foot wide implied 
easement? 
Answer to Question No.1: No. 
12. The trial then proceeded to phase two during which the Brattons presented 
their evidence on their claims for negligent interference with easement and tortious 
interference with their right of privacy. At the close of phase two of the trial, the jury 
returned a special verdict form finding that the Scotts negligently interfered with the 
Brattons' easement and changed the irrigation ditch. The jury, however, found that the 
change to the irrigation ditch did not result in a diminished flow of water to the Brattons' 
property. In addition, the jury found in favor ofthe Scotts with respect to the Brattons' claim 
for interference with the Brattons' easement by threat of harm and interference with the 
Brattons' right of privacy. (R, pp. 439-442). 
13. The case then proceeded to phase three of the trial on the issue of damages. 
At the close ofthis phase, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Brattons awarding 
damages in the amount of$4,250 for changing the irrigation ditch without written 
permission. The jury further awarded damages in the amount of $2,250 to restore the 
irrigation ditch to its original state. (R, pp. 451-452). 
14. The Scotts duly filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
requesting the district court reverse the damages award on the basis that the Brattons 
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presented no evidence to support a monetary award of damages. 1 (R, pp. 454-473). This 
motion was granted by the district court and a judgment was entered in favor of the Scotts. 
(R, pp. 495-497; 551-553). 
15. Thereafter, the Scotts made a motion for an award of costs and fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-121. (R, pp. 498-506). The district court granted this motion in part, 
awarding costs and fees to the Scotts in the amount of$54,329.56 and a judgment was 
entered accordingly. (R, pp. 649-654). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1973, Harold and Jeanette Ford were the record owners ofa parcel of real property 
in the Canyon County Fruitdale Farm Subdivision. (R, p. 12). The Fords divided the 
property into two lots, referred to as Lots 32 and 40. (Id.). The Fords then sold Lot 32 to the 
Brattons and executed a warranty deed which was duly recorded ("Warranty Deed"). (R, p. 
12). In order to obtain irrigation water to Lot 32, which consisted in large part of pasture 
ground, the Brattons negotiated and received an express easement for the construction and 
maintenance of an irrigation ditch and ingress and egress along the boundary line of Lot 40 
from the Fords. This easement is set forth in the WarrarityDeed as follows: 
Together with an easement along the boundary line between 
Lots 39 and 40 of FRUITDALE FARM SUBDIVISION, 
Section 3, Township 4 North, Range 3 West, Boise Meridian, 
Canyon County, Idaho, 3 feet in width and of a length of 
approximately 200 yards along said boundary line between 
Lots 39 and 40 for the construction and maintenance of an 
irrigation ditch and for ingress and egress along said ditch 
boundary line. 
(R, p. 12, emphasis added). 
1 The Scotts at'so moved for a directed verdict at the close of evidence of the damages phase of the 
trial on the same grounds. The district court deferred ruling until after the trial. 
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It was undisputed at trial and prior to trial that following the conveyance of Lot 32 to 
the Brattons, the Brattons proceeded to dig the irrigation ditch on Lot 40 owned at that time 
by the Fords (the "servient estate") within the easement granted in the warranty deed. (Tr, 
Vol. II, pp. 421-427; pp. 465-469). 
During the trial, both Mr. Ford and Mr. Bratton testified that after conveyance ofthe 
easement in the warranty deed, Mr. Ford orally expanded the width of the easement from 
three feet to twelve feet. However, it was undisputed by both Mr. Bratton and Mr. Scott that 
this oral agreement was never reduced to writing. (Tr, Vol. II, p. 468, II. 15-20). 
In January of 1996, Mr. Ford conveyed the servient estate (Lot 40) via quitclaim deed 
to Genice RaWlinson. (R, p. 14). Approximately nine years later, Ms. Rawlinson conveyed 
the servient estate to her daughter, Respondent Jackie Scott, and son~in-Iaw, Respondent 
John Scott, via a recorded deed. (R, p. 17). The deed transferring ownership of the servient 
estate to the Scotts conveyed the property, together with all "tenements, hereditaments, 
water, water rights, ditches, ditch rights, easements and appurtenances thereunto belonging or 
in anywise appertaining, and subject to any encumbrances or easements as appear of record 
or by use upon such property." (Id.). 
At the time the Scotts became owners of the servient estate, they were unaware that it 
contained an irrigation ditch along the boundary line. John Scott discovered the ditch shortly 
after he moved onto the property in the Summer of 2006 when he was mowing weeds on the 
property with his tractor. At that time, the ditch was covered in very tall weeds. (Tr, Vol. 
III, pp. 884-885). Mr. Scott testified that because he could not see the ditch at that time, he 
accidentally ran over it with the wheel of his tractor. (Tr, Vol. III, pp. 885-887). Mr. Scott 
then obtained a copy ofthe Warranty Deed from the county recorder's office and discovered 
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the easement over his property for an irrigation ditch. Mr. Scott later fixed the ditch so that 
Mr. Bratton's property could obtain irrigation water with the use of a loader bucket and small 
tractor in order to "back drag" the ditch and clean it up. (Tr, Vol. III, pp. 892-894). Mr. 
Scott did so with the agreement ofMr. Bratton. (Tr, Vol. III, p. 894). During phase one of 
the trial, a video taken by Mr. Scott was introduced into evidence showing that in the Spring 
of2007, after Mr. Scott cleaned up the ditch, water adequately flowed through the ditch and 
reached Mr. Bratton's property.2 (Tr, Vol. II, pp. 496-499). The Scotts also called to testify 
a professional videographer who had taken a video of the irrigation ditch after Mr. Scott had 
worked on it showing that irrigation water was clearly flowing through the ditch onto the 
Brattons' property. (Tr., Vol. III, pp. 1047-1048). 
The problems between the parties primarily began when Mr. Bratton entered the 
Scotts' property in the Spring of 2007 and began burning the weeds around the irrigation 
ditch. The flames, however, swept onto the Scotts' property approximately 10 to 15 feet 
from the boundary fence along where the easement is located, burning a substantial section 
of the Scotts' property. (Tr, Vol. III, pp. 888-890). The Scotts attempted to stomp on the 
flames to put out the fire on their property. (Tr, Vol. III, pp. 890-891). Thereafter the Scotts 
placed no trespassing signs on their property to remind Mr. Bratton and others to access the 
irrigation ditch easement at the site ofthe easement only. Mr. Scott testified several times 
that he at no time refused to allow Mr. Bratton to access and maintain the irrigation ditch. 
Mr. Bratton further testified that he received an offer through the Scotts' counsel to tum on 
2 The Brattons claimed that in doing so, Mr. Scott moved the location of the ditch. This was disputed 
by Mr. Scott, however the Brattons produced no evidence at trial to refute the videos and 
photographic evidence introduced by the Scotts that showed water was adequately flowing through 
the ditch onto the Brattons property starting in the Summer of 2007. 
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the headgate at Mr. Bratton's request so that water could reach the Brattons' property. Mr. 
Bratton refused: 
Q: Okay. And then you recall that myself, through your 
counsel, offered the Scotts to turn the water on for you? 
A: That wouldn't work because I couldn't control the 
water the way I wanted to, put on how much I needed and be 
able to maintain the ditch like I had to. 
Q: Okay. But you think the idea of them turning on the 
water for you so that you don't have to come onto their 
property was a dumb idea, right? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: Okay. And you think its a dumb idea because you think 
you have to turn the water on when you want it and tum it off 
when you want it, correct? 
A: You have to control your water, yes. You're liable for 
it. 
Q: Even if you gave the Scotts the exact times and the 
amount of water, amount of turns on the head gate that you 
wanted the water, is it still a dumb idea? 
A: I wouldn't know how many tums I'd want on the head 
gate until I saw what kind of water I wanted. 
Q: Okay. You haven't even tried it, have you, Mr. 
Bratton? You haven't even tried or attempted to allow the 
Scotts to turn on the head gate for you so that water could get 
, to your pasture; is that right? 
A: No. I didn't want any contact with them. I'm afraid of 
them. 
Q: Okay. And do you remember again in 2008 when the 
irrigation season came, I think it was in about June 2008, that 
the Scotts againoffered to turn on the head gate to allow water 
. to run through the ditch to reach your property? 
A: That water was not going to run through my ditch that I 
could control and take care of, no. 
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Q: Okay. Mr. Bratton, the question was, do you remember 
the offer in 2008 that was made against by the Scotts to tum 
the head gate on for you so that you could get water to your 
property? Do you remember the offer? 
A: It's still a dumb idea. 
Q: Okay. And so you didn't take them up at that time 
either, correct? 
A: No, because I wanted to control my own water. 
(Tr, Vol. III, pp. 1103-1104). 
Thus, the evidence at trial showed irrigation water flowed through the ditch onto the 
Brattons' property in an amount sufficient to irrigate his pasture. Mr. Bratton, however, 
refused to tum on the headgates and work with Mr. Scott to irrigate his pasture. Instead, Mr. 
Bratton filed the underlying lawsuit. Mr. Bratton testified during the trial that he believed he 
had the right to do whatever he needed to do to take care of the ditch and could access the 
ditch any way he wanted because, "It's my easement. I've been doing it for 35 years and it 
was my right." (Tr., Vol II pp. 1092 - 1093) Mr. Bratton therefore appeared to have no real 
concern or respect for the Scotts' property rights. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Appellant's Opening Brief, they fail to identifY the issues on appeal. While it is 
unclear, the Brattons appear to be appealing two issues as set forth in their standard of review 
section: (1) the district court's issuance of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of 
the Scotts; and (2) the district court's denial of the Bratton's motion for a new trial. (See App. 
Brief, pp. 8-9). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that in reviewing a decision to grant or deny a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Court applies the same standard as that 
applied by the trial court when originally ruling on the motion. Olson v. EG&G Idaho, Inc., 
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134 Idaho 778, 781, 9 P.3d 1244,1247 (2000) (upholding the district court's decision 
granting respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict) (citation omitted). 
When ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must 
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. [d. (citation 
omitted). Upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the moving party admits 
the truth of all of the adverse evidence and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from 
it. [d. at 782, 9 P.3d at 1248 (citation omitted). "It is not a question of no evidence on the. 
side of the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is substantial evidence upon which a 
jury could find for the non-moving party." !d. (citation omitted). The Court will not make a 
finding of substantial evidence in favor of the non-moving party if it concludes "that there 
can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached." !d. 
(citation omitted). In deciding a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial 
court may not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses, but must 
draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. [d. (citation omitted). 
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial, the Idaho Supreme 
Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 529, 81 
P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003) (upholding district court's denial of appellant's motion for new trial) 
(citation omitted). A trial court has wide discretion to grant or refuse to grant a new trial, and 
on appeal the Court will not disturb that exercise of discretion absent a showing of manifest 
abuse. [d. (citation omitted). The test for evaluating whether a trial court has abused its 
discretion is as follows: 
(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal 
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standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Id. at 530, 81 P.3d at 1240 (citations omitted). 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Scotts present the following additional issues: 
1. Did the district court err in applying section 42-1204 and 42-1207 ofthe Idaho 
Code to this case and instructing the jury on these statutes? 
2. Did the district err in allowing evidence regarding an implied easement which 
contradicted the terms of the express easement contained in the Warranty Deed? 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Scotts are requesting an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to section 
12-121 of the ~daho Code on the basis that the arguments advanced by Appellants in this 
appeal are rneritless and without foundation, as explained below. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Properly Granted the Scotts' Motion for Directed Verdict. 
The Brattons first challenge the district court's grant of a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, arguing this ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. This Court must therefore 
determine whether there was substantial evidence presented by the Brattons during the 
damages phase ofthe trial to support the jury's verdict award of damages in the amount of 
$6,500.00. 
1. Damages Mnst Be Proven To A Reasonable Certainty. 
Idaho courts have held that a person asserting a claim for damages has the burden of 
proving not only a right to damages, but also the amount of damages. Martsch v. Nelson, 
109 Idaho 95,100,705 P.2d 1050,1055 (Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing Beare v. 
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Stowe's Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317, 321, 658 P.2d 988,992 (Ct. App. 1983» .. 
Further, the amount of damages must be sllPported by substantial evidence and not based 
upon mere conjecture. !d.; (citing Alper v. Stillings, 389 P.2d 239 (Nev. 1964». The 
evidence must be of sufficient quality and probative value that the trier of fact could 
reasonably conclude that an award of such amount was proper. Id. (citation omitted). 
Where the only proof presented on the amount of damages requires that the trier of 
fact make a "blind guess" as to the amount of damages or loss involved, an award of 
damages is not proper. See Beare, 104 Idaho at 321,658 P.2d at 992; (citing Call v .. Coiner, 
43 Idaho 320, 251 P. 617 (1926); see also, e.g., Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 937 P.2d 
434 (Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the award of damages where the plaintiffs presented 
evidence of bids reflecting the amount to repair the ditch and the amount and value of trees 
that had been damaged). Similarly, the amount of damages must be established to a 
reasonable degree of certainty. See Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, 772 P.3d 99,106 
(2005). 
In its Special Verdict Form, the jury awarded the Brattons the sum of$2,250.00 in 
damages to restore the ditch to its original state. (R., p. 451-452). The jury also awarded the 
Brattons damages in the sum of $4,250.00 for the Scotts' actions of allegedly changing the 
irrigation ditch without written permission. These awards are discussed separately as 
follows. 
2. The Brattons Completely Failed To Meet Their Burden Of Proof At Trial 
Regarding Damages For Moving The Ditch. 
Following the jury's Special Verdict following phase two ofthe trial, the only claim 
remaining during the damages phase of the trial was for negligent interference and changing 
the ditch without written permission. The Brattons lost their claims for infliction of 
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emotional distress and interference with the right of privacy. In addition, the jury specifically 
found that the Scotts' alleged actions had not resulted in a diminished water flow through the 
irrigation ditch. (R. pp. 439-442). Thus, the jury found no liability on the part of the Scotts 
with respect to the Brattons' claim for breach of privacy and interference by threat of harm. 
The jury found that the Scotts were negligent, but the negligence did not cause an 
impediment to the water flow in the ditch. The Brattons were left solely with recovery of 
damages for repair oftheir property, or more specifically moving the ditch back to the 
location they claimed it was in. 
During the damages phase ofthe trial, the Brattons presented evidence with respect to 
the installation and maintenance of an above-ground ditch. However, the Brattons presented 
absolutely no evidence with respect to what this would cost. (TR. Vol. IV, pp. 1466-1484, 
1495-1504). For example, there was no evidence presented tothejury with respect to how 
much the materials would cost, what the labor rate was for installation, the amount oftime it 
would take, etc. The reason this crucial evidence was not presented is because it had not 
been disclosed in discovery and the district court therefore appropriately ruled that it could 
not be presented at trial. In other words, because the Brattons had not disclosed in discovery 
what repairing the ditch would cost, nor hired an expert to opine on these costs or disclosed a 
lay witness to testify regarding the actnal cost of repairing the alleged injury to their property, 
the Brattons were precluded by the district court from presenting such evidence during the 
damages phase of the trial. The district court reasoned as follows: 
So that gives me guidance in what I have to decide here today. 
I have to view all ofthe evidence and all of the inferences 
drawn therefrom in favor ofthe nonmoving party, and I had to 
go back and look at the verdict forms which said there had 
been an inference and there had been - that the Scotts had 
taken action without written permission. And then I have to 
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look ifthere's substantial evidence to justify submitting the 
case to the jury, or, as they say, "in other words, that there can 
be one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could 
have reached." 
And the discovery issue that I mentioned earlier was really the 
reason - I heard no estimates, no bids, no dollar amounts, no 
time, no materials. I did hear testimony that it would cost to 
move the ditch back where it was or to move it so it could be 
maintained, but I never heard a dollar amount. 
(Tr, Vol V, pp. 1576-1577). 
On appeal, the Appellants do not appear to be challenging the ruling to exclude this 
evidence, but are claiming that the jury was able to award damages in its absence. 
Appellants point the Court to Smith v. Big Lost River, 83 Idaho 374, 392, 364 P.2d 146 
(1961), and argue the jury had a first hand opportunity to view the evidence. (App. Brief, p. 
31) The Smith case does not involve a challenge to the amount of a damages award, but 
rather to the determination of the cause of damages. /d. Moreover, the court in Smith noted 
that "[t]he record of evidence introduced is voluminous" and "expert witnesses testified at 
length." [d. 
Appellants also point the Court to several cases which stand for the basic proposition 
that damages awards are to be left to the purview of the jury, which can use their sound 
judgment. (App. Brief, p. 11), (citing Shrum v. Wakimoto, 70 Idaho 252, 256, 215 P.2d 991 
(1950); Gonzales v. Hodson, 91 Idaho 330 (1966)). Yet none of these cases stand for the 
proposition that a plaintiff can simply ask the jury to award it damages to repair its property 
without any evidence whatsoever on what a reasonable cost would be for the repair, which is 
, essentially what happened in phase three of the trial. 
The ohly way the jury would have been able to award a dollar amount to the Brattons 
was through "guessing" or "speculating" what this might cost. This is improper. See Beare, 
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104 Idaho at 32, 658 P.2d at 992. The district court therefore correctly set aside the damages 
verdict as follows: 
I conclude that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on damages is hereby granted. And I base that on 
Watson, 121 Idaho at 659. 'There can be but one conclusion as 
to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached, and 
when the conclusion does not conform to the jury verdict, then 
the court can entertain the judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. The function of a JNOV is to give this court the last 
opportunity to order the judgment that the law requires.' 
I conclude that without estimates, bids, monetary amounts, 
time, materials, that the jury could not have concluded the 
amount of damages that they did and that they were making 
estimates. 
(Tr, Vol. V, pp. 1579-1580). 
3. The Award of Damages For Failure To Obtain Written Permission To 
Change The Ditch Was Not Supported By The Evidence. 
The jury also placed an arbitrary number of$4,250.00 in damages as a result ofthe 
Scotts' failure to obtain written permission prior to the alleged move of the ditch. This award 
was not supported by the law. The written permission requirement is found in Idaho Code § 
42-1207, which was included, in part, in Jury Instruction No. 24 given to the jury. Under 
Allen v. BurggraffConstruction Co., 106 Idaho 451,680 P.2d 873 (1984), before recovery 
can be had based upon negligence or violation of Section 42-1207, the landowners are 
"required to show that relocation of the ditch actually caused a diminished flow of water to 
their properties." [d. At 452, 680 P.2d at 874. The court in Allen went on to state that 
"[p ]roof of causation is essential to invoke the statute." [d. Thus, unless the Brattons were 
able to show an impeded water flow, they could not establish causation as a matter of law. If 
unable to establish causation in a negligence action, or action under Section 42-1207, no 
damages could be awarded - whether those damages are compensatory or nominal damages. 
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In Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 8 P.3d 1234 (2000), this Court held that the 
plaintiff could not recover any damages under Section 42-1207 of the Idaho Code because he 
failed to introduce any evidence of the historic flow rate of water to his property before and 
after the changes to the lateral ditch. [d. At 700, 8 P.3d at 1243. The Court noted that 
Section 42-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation ditch "in a manner which impedes the flow of 
water." [d. Thus, as a matter oflaw, the Brattons could not satisfy the causation element of 
their negligence action unless they could show impeded water flow. Not only did they fail to 
do so, the jury specifically found that the water flow had not been impeded. 
The .district court below indicated during previous argument that it would be proper 
for the jury to award nominal damages under Section 42-1207 in the absence of actual 
damages, if the Scotts failed to obtain written permission to change the ditch, and therefore 
allowed the Plaintiffs to proceed to the damages phase of the trial on this issue. Yet after the 
jury verdict the district court determined an award of $4,250.00 in damages was not nominal. 
(Tr, Vol. V, pp. 1580-1581). The district court therefore correctly reversed this award of 
damages and granted the Scotts a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Appellants argue that Section 42-1207 allows for damages, without limitation, if there 
was ilI)peded water flow or if the ditch was changed. (App. Brief, p. 39). Yet the plain 
language of the statute does not support this argument. Section 42-1207 provides that when a 
ditch has been constructed across or beneath another's land, "the person or persons owning or 
controlling said land shall have the right at their own expense to change said ditch ... to any 
other part of said land, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to impede the 
flow of the water therein, or to otherwise injure any person or persons using or interested in 
such ditch, canal .... " LC. § 42-1207. The remainder of the statute discusses the 
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landowner's right to bury the ditch if certain conditions are met. [d. The statute makes clear 
that written permission of the ditch owner must be obtained before it is changed or buried by 
the landowner. [d. 
The statute theref~re does not state that the ditch owner is allowed recovery for harm 
if the ditch Was changed without permission. It does not relieve the Brattons from their duty 
to prove causation, especially when read in light of this Court's opinion in Weaver v. 
Stafford, supra., wherein the Court made clear that absent evidence of a reduction in water 
flow the plaintiff could not recover under Section 42-1207. 134 Idaho at 699,8 P.3d at 1242. 
B. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard To Appellant's Claim 
For An Implied Easement. 
Appellants argue that the district court erred when it ruled that Section 42-1102 of the 
Idaho Code did not apply to the Brattons' claim for an expanded easement of 12 feet in 
width, and thereafter declined to instruct the jury on this statute. (App. Brief, pp. 18-19,35-
37). Similarly, the Brattons take issue with the district court's decision to apply the law of 
implied easements by prior use as set forth in Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 
392 (2006), and instruct the jury accordingly. The Brattons instead insist that the proper 
legal standard to apply to their claim for an expanded easement of 12 feet in width is found in 
Idaho Code §42-1102. 
At the outset it is important to note that the issue presented to the jury in phase one of 
the trial was for the purposes of an advisory verdict only. The district court had ruled that 
this issue was one for the court to make the ultimate determination because the Brattons had 
specifically plead their implied easement claim as an injunctive claim and requested 
declaratory and injunctive relief only in the Complaint. (R. pp. 1-9; Tr., Vol. I, 246 - 252). 
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After hearing the evidence, the jury found that the Brattons had not proven a 12 foot implied 
easement or right of way of 12 feet, and the district court ruled in the same manner. 
1. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standards To The 
Brattons' Claim For An Expanded 12 Foot Easement. 
For the very first time, a mere day or so before trial, the Brattons cited and argued the 
applicability of Idaho Code § 42-1102, arguing that this statute .controls their claim for an 
implied 12-foot easement. The Brattons then took this position throughout the trial, urging 
the district court to ignore the well settled caselaw regarding implied easements as set forth 
in Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.2d 392 (2006). See also, e.g., Beitzel v. Orton, 
121 Idaho 709, 827 P.2d 1160 (1992). 
First, Appellants' Amended Complaint asserts a claim for'an implied easement and at 
no point mentions a claimed right of way pursuant to statute. (R. pp. 1-9). Appellants also 
moved for summary judgment on their claim of implied easement, arguing the elements set 
forth in Thomas, which was denied. (R. pp. 47-60). Thus, throughout the duration of the 
lawsuit, Plaintiffs sought to expand the scope of the undisputed written easement through the 
legal doctrine of implied easement from prior use. 
Afterthe Brattons raised the applicability of Section 42-1102, in addition to several 
other statutes discussing irrigation water, the district court ruled that the law of implied 
easements could not be ignored, and the court would proceed to instruct the jury and consider 
the elements required by this Court to establish an implied easement by prior use, as had 
been plead in the Brattons' Complaint. The district court did, however, instruct the jury on 
Section 42-1207 of the Idaho Code. (See Jury Instruction No. 10, R, p. 407). This 
instruction was given following both phases one and two of the trial. (Id., Tr, p. 420). This 
instruction contained direct quotes from Section 42-1204 as follows: 
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The owners or constructors of ditches, canals, works or other 
aqueducts and their successors in interest, using and employing 
the same to convey the waters of any stream ot spring, whether 
the said ditches, canals, works or aqueducts be upon the lands 
owned or claimed by them, or upon other lands, must carefully 
keep and maintain the same, and the embankments, flumes or 
other conduits, by which such waters are or may be conducted, 
in good repair and condition, so as not to damage or in any way 
injure the property or premises of others. The owners or 
constructors have the right to enter the land across which the 
right-of-way extends, for the purposes of cleaning, maintaining 
and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit, and to occupy such 
width of the land along the banks ofthe ditch, canal or conduit 
as is necessary to properly do the work of cleaning, 
maintaining and repairing the ditch, canal or conduit with 
personnel and with such equipment as is commonly used, or is 
reasonably adapted, to that work. 
(R, p. 407, Idaho Code § 42-1204). The jury was therefore instructed following phase one of 
the trial that the owners of a ditch have the right to enter land for the purposes of cleaning, 
maintaining and repairing the ditch. This language is similar to that found in Section 42-
1102, which was requested by the Brattons. The jury was therefore adequately instructed on 
both the statutory laws regarding rights-of-way for irrigation ditches and the law of implied 
easements found in Thomas. Moreover, the jury instructions given in phase one of the trial 
were to help the jury render an advisory verdict only. Thus, any error in instructing the jury 
during phase one of the trial constitutes harmless error as the district court made the ultimate 
determination on the scope and width ofthe Brattons' easement, as was specifically 
requested in the Complaint by the Brattons. 
Finally, Idaho Code § 42-1102 is inapplicable in this case based upon the plain 
language of the statute. Section 42-1102 provides rights-of-way for irrigation rights and 
reads as follows: 
When any such owners or claimants to land have not sufficient 
length of frontage on a stream to afford the requisite fall for a 
ditch, canal or other conduit on their own premises for the 
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proper irrigation thereof, or where the land proposed to be 
irrigated is back from the banks of such stream, and convenient 
facilities otherwise for the water of said lands cannot be had, 
such owners or claimants are entitled to a right-of-way through 
the lands of others, for the pnrposes of irrigation .... 
I.C. § 42-1102. Under the statutory definitions, the Brattons are not claimants to land lacking 
sufficient length of frontage on a stream, nor is Plaintiffs' land ''back from the banks of a 
stream." The statute is therefore inapplicable and the district court did not err when it 
declined to apply this statute. 
Finally, no matter how the law and facts are viewed, the Brattons simply could not 
prove that an easement by implication from prior use had arisen to expand the width ofthe 
three foot express easement to 12 feet that they had a right-of-way on the servient estate 
which extended beyond three feet. This Court made clear in Thomas that in order to 
establish an easement by prior use, the party claiming such an easement must prove the 
following elements: (1) unity of title of ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the 
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before conveyance of the 
dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement 
must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe dominant estate. 142 Idaho at 
638,132 P.2d at 395. (emphasis added.) 
In order to satisfy the second element of an implied easement by prior use, the 
Brattons needed to show that the use occurred prior to separation of the dominant and 
servient estate, for a duration long enough before separation to show that the use was 
intended to be permanent. Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638, 132 P.2d at 395. See also Davis v. 
Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). In other words, an easement by implied 
reservation "must arise at a time when there is unity of title." 25 Am Jur. 2d, Easements and 
Licenses, § 25. This element appears to be standard among jurisdictions and is explained 
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further as follows: 
In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the 
property must have been openly used in a manner constituting 
a quasi-easement while it was in a single ownership. Upon 
severance, the common grantor should manifest an intent that 
the quasi-easement continue as a true easement. 
Id.; see also Davis, 133 Idaho at 642, 991 P.2d at 367 (in order to establish an implied 
easement by prior use, there must be "apparent continuous use long enough before separation 
ofthe dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent"). 
There was no dispute at trial, nor throughout the underlying proceedings, that the 
irrigation ditch was dug by the Brattons after they purchased Lot 39 from the Fords. 
Accordingly there was no way for the Brattons to prevail on a claim of implied easement by 
prior use and obtain an easement larger in width than the express easement contained in the 
Warranty Deed. 
The Brattons argue on appeal that even if they could not establish all elements 
required for a common law implied easement, inclimate weather delayed placement of the 
ditch until after the conveyance of the dominant property. (App. Brief, p. 21). The Brattons 
then cite Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 827 P.2d 706 (1992). The 
Phillips opinion, however, does not stand for the proposition that the Brattons do not need to 
show the second element set forth in Thomas opinion of apparent and continuous use prior to 
separation ofthe dominant and servient estates. In Phillips, the court upheld the trial court's 
conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove all elements of an easement by implication 
and there is no discussion in this opinion of whether or not the apparent continuous use needs 
to have occurred prior to separation ofthe estates. Indeed, the court stated as follows: 
The creation of easements by implication rests upon exceptions 
to the rule that written instruments speak for themselves, and 
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because implied easements are in derogation of such rule, they 
are not favored by the courts. The general rule is that the 
burden of proof rests upon the person asserting it to show the 
existence of facts necessary to create by implication an 
easement appurtenant to his estate. 
[d. (quoting Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403,406-07 (1961». 
Appellants also argue that necessity is an element of an implied easement by prior 
use. While it is true that the third element of an implied easement requires that it be 
"reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate," this element is in 
addition to the remaining two elements, which include a showing that the apparent 
continuous use occurred before separation of the estates. See Thomas, 142 Idaho at 638-639, 
, 
132 P.2d at 395-96. The element of necessity therefore does not relieve the Brattons from 
also having to establish that the use occurred prior to separation ofthe estates. 
In sum, the Appellants brought a claim in their Complaint for an easement by 
implication from 'prior use and requested a declaration or injunction by the court that such an 
easement had arisen. The Appellants changed their position the eve of trial and argued that 
the common law elements for proving an easement by implication from prior use no longer 
applied and that the controlling law is set forth in Idaho Code § 42-1102 et seq., despite the 
fact that at no time did the Brattons plead a right-of-way. The district court, over objections 
of the Scotts,:instructed the jury during phase one of the trial on both the common law 
elements of an implied easement by prior use and the statutory law set forth in Idaho Code § 
42-1204. These instructions adequately covered both of the Brattons' inconsistent 
arguments. The district court then applied the correct legal standards found in the statutes 
and case law for implied easements by prior use and adopted the advisory verdict from the 
jury in favor of the Scotts. No error of law occurred that would warrant a new trial. 
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C. The District Court's Decisiou to Divide the Trial Into Three Phases Did Not 
Result in Any Harm to Appellants. 
Appellants argue on appeal that the district court's decision to divide the trial into 
three phases constitutes an irregularity in the proceedings sufficient for the grant of a new 
trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and the district court should have 
granted them a new trial on this basis. The Brattons, however, have failed to demonstrate 
how the decision to trifurcate the trial deprived them of a fair trial or was decided in error. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(I), the district court must consider 
whether there has been any irregularity in the proceedings, or any order ofthe court or abuse 
of discretion, which has deprived either party of a fair trial such that a new trial would be 
justified. O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 804, 810 P.2d 1082, 1090 (1991). The Brattons 
;:Irgue that the bifurcated3 trial doubled the trial time, was confusing to the jury, and was in 
"violation of judicial premise of orderly and efficient litigation." (App. Brief, pp. 34-35). 
This argument is without merit. The district court's decision to bifurcate the trial was 
rendered equally to all parties. The Scotts had to make the same pre-trial adjustments as the 
Brattons in the same amount oftime. The Brattons received a partially favorable verdict in 
phases two and three of the trial and they asked for and received direction from the district 
court, on more than one occasion, regarding the scope of evidence during the trial. The 
Brattons simply have not shown how the decision to bifurcate the trial deprived them of a fair 
trial. 
D. The Trial Court Did not Err in Awarding Partial Attorneys' Fees and Costs to 
the Scotts. 
The Brattons challenge the award of partial attorneys' fees and costs to the Scotts on 
two bases. First, the Brattons claim that the Scotts were not the overall prevailing party in 
3 Plaintiffs refer to the bifurcation as "trifurcation." 
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this action, and second, the Brattons claim that the underlying action was not frivolous 
pursuant to Section 12-121 of the Idaho Code. 
1. The Scotts Were the Overall Prevailing Party In This Lawsnit. 
The determination of a prevailing party is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'!, Inc., 130 Idaho 255, 258, 939 P.2d 574, 577 
(1997). To determine which party is the prevailing party the district court must consider the 
final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought by the parties. Id. R. Civ. P. 
54(d)(1)(B). This Court has interpreted Rule 54(d)(1)(B) holding that a defendant is a 
prevailing party ifhe avoids allliability following a jury trial. See Eighteen Mile Ranch, 
LLC v. NordExcavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 16,719,117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). In 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, this Court stated as follows: 
A voiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. In 
baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of 
course, is more exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability is as 
good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a' 
plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large money· 
. judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply 
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not 
ignore the value of a successful defense. 
Id. at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. Where a defendant escapes liability, and thus obtains "the most 
favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved," he is the prevailing party. Id.; see also 
Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 262, 999 P.7d 914, 
917 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the defendant was the prevailing party where it received 
the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved when it received a dismissal of 
the case with prejudice and where the plaintiff gained no benefit as a consequence of the 
litigation). 
At the end of the trial and post trial motions, the Scotts received the most favorable 
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outcome possible - a complete avoidance of liability. Although the jury found in favor of the 
Brattons on their negligence claim, there were no damages awarded. The district court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining the Scotts were the overall prevailing 
party. 
2. Plaintiffs' claims were frivolonsly pursued and attorneys' fees were 
warranted pursuantto Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Under Idaho Code Section 12-121, attorneys' fee maybe awarded to the prevailing 
party where the court finds from the facts presented that the case was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See I.C. § 12-121; Id. R. Civ. P. 54(e)(I). 
The district court found that, in many respects, the Brattons brought and pursued this case 
frivolously;unreasonably, and without foundation, and the Scotts were therefore entitled to 
an award of attorneys' fees. 
Ali award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 12-121 is discretionary, must be 
. supported by findings, and those findings must be supported by the record. Conley v. 
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 274, 985 P.2d 1127, 1136 (1999) (citations omitted). "When an 
exercise of discretion is involved, an appellate court conducts a three-step analysis: (I) 
whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consIstently with any legal standards 
appiicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by the exercise 
of reason." [d. (citation omitted). In Conley, the district court recited at length and in great 
detail its reasons for awarding costs and attorney fees to the respondents. [d. The record in 
that case showed that the plaintiff maintained that the easement at issue gave him carte 
blanche to make changes in the existing road as he saw fit. [d. The district court concluded 
that the plaintiff's position in that case was so plainly fallacious and violative of the rights of 
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the servient landowners that an award of fees to the respondents as the prevailing parties in 
the action was justified. !d. The plaintiff in that case failed to demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion on appeal, and thus the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's award of 
attorney fees and costs to the respondents. Id. 
A brief review of the record of this case reveals that the Brattons brought and pursued 
several frivolous claims resulting in an urmecessary expense of fees by the Scotts. In their 
original Complaint, the Brattons alleged that the Scotts made "physical bodily threats to 
Plaintiffs" and alleged a cause of action for "tortuous [sic] stalking" against them. (R, pp. 1-
9). The tortious stalking claim was completely without merit and was dismissed upon 
motion made by the Scotts because Idaho does not recognize a private right of action for such 
claim. (R. pp. 18-35). 
Thereafter, the Brattoils amended their Complaint to again allege that Defendants had 
made "physical bodily threats to Plaintiffs." (R. pp. 94-110). Counsel for the Scotts then 
took the deposition of Charles Bratton on February 6, 2008. During his deposition, Mr. 
Bratton admitted that Mr. Scott did not threaten to harm him in any way. Mr. Bratton again 
admitted this at trial. (Tr., Vol. III, pp. 1075-1084). However, despite these admissions by 
Mr. Bratton, Appellants frivolously continued to advance their claim for negligence based 
" 
upon physical threats by the Scotts all the way through trial. This forced the Scotts to have to 
continue to defend this meritless claim and to expend continued time and expense in fighting 
these admittedly baseless allegations. This claim was ultimately rejected by the jury but only 
after a costly4rial. 
Additionally, the Brattons moved for partial summary judgment on January 11, 2008, 
on the issue of whether they were entitled to an express three-foot easement as well as a 12-
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foot implied easement by prior use. (R. pp. 47-48). The Scotts did not dispute the existence 
of the express three-foot easement as set forth in the warranty deed, rendering summary 
judgment unnecessary. In addition, as previously set forth, it was clear that the Brattons 
could not meet all of the elements set forth in Thomas v. Madsen and Davis v. Peacock for an 
implied easement by prior use. (R,pp. 124-134). 
At the February 21,2008 hearing on the Brattons' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, the district court reviewed the pleadings and the court record and denied the 
Brattons' motion, in part, ruling from the bench that Plaintiffs have no more than a three-foot 
express easement, and that the Brattons had not presented any evidence that they maintained 
a 12-foot easement prior to the separation of the dominant estate. (Tr, Vol. I, pp. 56-61). 
Despite the fact that the Brattons could not establish all of the elements for an implied 
easement as set forth in Thomas v. Madsen, they continued to assert this claim through trial. 
Again, the Scotts were forced to continue to defend a meritless claim by the Brattons. The 
jury ultimately found that the Brattons were not entitled to a 12-foot implied easement and 
the district court ruled in the same manner following trial on this issue. However, the Scotts 
were still forced to respond to, defend, and ultimately go to trial on this issue incurring 
significant attorney's fees on yet another baseless claim asserted by the Brattons. 
Similarly, the Brattons' invasion of privacy claim was frivolous and completely 
unsupported, as a matter of law, by the evidence presented at trial. Liability for a claim of 
invasion of privacy by intrusion requires: (1) an intentional intrusion by the defendant; (2) 
into a matter, which the plaintiffhas a right to keep private; (3) by the use of a method, 
which is objectionable to the reasonable person. Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57, 62, 72 P.3d 
897,902 (2003) (citing 62A Am Jur 2d, Privacy § 48 (1990) and Uranga v. Federated 
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Publications, Inc., 138 Idaho 550, 67 P.3d 29 (2003); Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311, 
317, 971 P.2d 1135, 1141 (1999). In order to constitute an invasion of privacy, an act must 
be of such a nature as a reasonable person can see might and probably would cause mental 
distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligences, situated in like 
circumstances as the plaintiff. Id. At trial, the Brattons only presented evidence than the 
Scotts were staring at them and installing video surveillance on their home. However, the 
evidence also showed that the video surveillance was installed on the Scotts' home so that 
they could protect themselves. The Brattons presented no evidence that the cameras reached 
their property, and they do not even live at the property at issue, which is 10 acres away from 
the Scotts' home. Again, this claim was completely unreasonable and not founded in law or 
fact. 
Also at trial, the Brattons were precluded from presenting evidence regarding their 
damages because they failed to disclose the same in discovery. Thus, despite the fact that the 
Brattons did not present any evidence regarding any amount of damages, they continued to 
purs'ue their damage claims which forced the Scotts to expend significant time and expense. 
The damage portion alone took one day of trial. 
Every claim asserted against the Scotts, with the exception ofthe claim that the Scotts 
did not dispute, failed. The Brattons' tortious stalking claim was dismissed because it was 
unsupported by law. The Brattons' claim for declaratory judgment for an implied 12 foot 
easement was baseless, where they could not establish the legal elements for such a claim. 
The Brattons further took nothing from their negligence claim, which was based in part on 
admittedly frivolous allegations that the Scotts had physically threatened Mr. Bratton. The 
jury rejected the Brattons' tortious interference with privacy ciaim, which was based on 
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allegations that were unsupported by the law. The Brattons also brought a motion seeking 
punitive damages, which was denied. 
In ruling on the Scotts' motion for fees pursuant to Section 12-121, the district court 
reasoned in part as follows: 
Now, further comments. Idaho has never recognized the tort of 
tortious stalking, so the defendant is clearly the prevailing part 
with regard to that. And because Idaho does not have a cause 
of action, I believe I find that that claim was pursued 
frivolously. 
Then as to the threat of harm by Mr. Scott to Mr. Bratton and 
the invasion of privacy, it is my conclusion that that was also 
pursued frivolously, and the jury's verdict does support that. 
On the other hand, the jury's verdict, of course, supports the 
claimed - the claims made by the plaintiff that the easement 
was interfered with and that the ditch was changed and that 
there was no written permission. 
And that written permission question did create a lot of 
concerns, and I conveyed those to counsel- I think most of 
them were in chambers - because the legislature did change the 
statute, and it was changed after the express easement between 
the parties ~ or the predecessor to the party. But in any event, 
it was the current state of the law, so that question was asked. 
And I don't know that that was ever clearly defended against 
the defense. I mean, I don't remember them trying to justify it. 
But in any event, I think it was a finding that I had to have the 
jury make. 
The plaintiffs clearly had their express three-foot easement, but 
the jury concluded that they did not have an implied easement 
for twelve feet. That three-foot easement was never disputed 
by the defendants. In fact, the plaintiffs conceded it existence 
from the outset of the case. 
The jury found no invasion of privacy. The jury found that Mr. 
Bratton never. threatened the defendant. 
So I am called upon to determine under the statute prevailing 
parties, and I am permitted to determine whether a party to an 




Ultimately, there was a prevailing party in the lawsuit in my 
mind, that being the defendants. And as a result, I am going to 
award them costs as a matter of right, and then the 
discretionary costs in the sum of $9,753.41. 
The. dicier part of this obviously is the attorney's fees. It is true 
that I don't think this was ever a case for punitive damages. In 
fact, I get frustrated and maybe stated when I was ruling that I 
see it brought too often, it seems like. It's got to be extreme 
and outrageous conduct. Ms. Garrett argued that it was the 
kind on conduct based, I guess on the threats of harm. 
And I will tell you that I considered having the defendants 
refile an itemized bill with regard to their attorney's fees, and 
that would have been in relation to awarding them costs with 
regard to their defense of the frivolous allegations of threat of 
harm by Mr. Scott to Mr. Bratton, frivolous allegations of 
invasion of privacy, frivolous allegations of implied easement, 
the bringing of punitive damages, and that was based on the 
verdict. 
So I thought, well, maybe the thing to do would be to have 
their firm sort out all of those issues and resubmit a new 
affidavit for potential objection by the other side. 
I decided, after looking over those itemized bills and 
considering everything that occurred at the trial and how so 
many of these issues wrapped and twisted around each other in 
the various facts, that it would be more appropriate - and 
particularly in light of the verdict form, the second verdict, that 
I read into the record, that it would be more appropriate to 
afford - or accord the defense - defendant attorney's fees in 
half the value that they are seeking in the document memo 
filed .. 
And again, that kind of goes to how the jury came down on 
their answers to the questions in the special verdict form. 
I think ultimately when you look at that, that that's a fair 
apportionment of costs in this case, and so ,at this· point, that is 
my ultimate decision. 
(Tr, Vol. V, pp. 1625-1628). 
In its opening brief, the Brattons state the record very clearly discloses that the 
65685-0001ILEGAL18008161.1 31 
Brattons' case was necessary and reasonable and was not brought frivolously or 
unreasonably or without foundation. (App. Brief, p. 43). The Brattons, however, have not 
addressed the individual bases for the Scotts' request of an award of fees under Section 12-
121 or the district court's rationale as quoted above. This case involved multiple motions 
brought by the Brattons which were denied by the district court and deemed frivolous. The 
district court was in the best position to review the case as a whole as the district court had 
presided over the case in its entirety and was very familiar with how the case was prosecuted 
and argued by the Brattons. Thus, the statement in Appellants' Brief that the record is clear 
that their case was not frivolous is not enough to show that the award of fees should be set 
aside. 
E. The District Court Erred In Applying Section 42-1207 and 42-1204 To The Issue 
of whether the Brattons' Easement Was 12 Feet in Length. 
After the Brattons asked the court to apply I.C. §§ 42-1207 and 42-1204 to this case 
on the eve of trial, the Scotts strenuously objected on the basis that these statutes were 
inapplicable. (Tr, Vol II, pp. 532 - 534; Vol I, pp, 241-243) The Brattons have an express 
easement which sets forth the parameters of their irrigation ditch. The Brattons therefore 
should not have been allowed to use these statutes or the theory of easement by implication, 
to contradict the terms of the express easement, which are unambiguous. In Phillips 
Industries, supra, the Court held that when interpreting and construing a deed, the court's 
function is to carry out the real intention of the parties, which is limited to the language of the 
deed ifit is unambiguous. Id., 121 Idaho at 697 -698. 
The Brattons did not argue that the warranty deed is ambiguous. Thus, the jury 
should have never been allowed to hear evidence that contradicted the express easement 
contained in the warranty deed or to have considered the statutes which would allow for a 
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right of way in contradiction to the tenns of the express easement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As stated many times by connsel for the Scotts throughout the transcript ofthe 
proceedings, this was an unfortunate case brought and prosecuted by the Brattons which 
resulted in an unnecessary and unwarranted expense by both parties. The undisputed 
evidence at trialwas that any alleged changes to the irrigation ditch by the Scotts at no time 
resulted in an impediment of water flow to the Brattons' property. Nonetheless, the Brattons 
deliberately refused to avoid any hann to their property and refused to tum on the irrigation 
water or allow someone else to tum on the irrigation water and instead prosecuted this 
lawsuit with vigor. Idaho law, however, at no time provided the Brattons with the 
justification to do so. 
The Scotts respectfully submit that the Brattons have not met their burden to show 
that the district court erred in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or declining to 
grant the Brattons' motion for a new trial. The Brattons have failed to establish any errors of 
law that would have resulted in a different outcome in this case. The Scotts therefore request 
this Court deny the appeal and award the Scotts their costs and fees on appeal for having to 
yet again defend the Brattons' claims. 
DATED: IJtu& ( ,2010 PERKINS COlE LLP 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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